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Voluntary environmental agreements have been popular with government agencies in 
several countries.  However, many questions remain about their efficiency as a regulatory 
tool.  Recent analyses suggest that they are more effective than classical regulatory or 
economic approaches when dealing with nonpoint pollution and when innovation processes 
at the source are necessary to define effective regulation.  This paper applies an activity-
based framework to assess the contribution of voluntary agreements to the environmental 
performance of farms participating voluntarily in a whole farm plan in the Southern part of 
Belgium.  Using a cross-section of 52 farms, our results show that farms entering into 
environmental agreements are environmentally more efficient than non-participating farms 




Keywords: Agri-environmental indicators, Data envelopment analysis, Environmental 
efficiency, Voluntary agreements, Whole farm plan 
 





Voluntary Agreements and the Environmental Efficiency of Participating Farms 
 
1.  Introduction 
Governments have become increasingly interested and involved in voluntary environmental 
agreements regulating different sectors of the economy.  By 1996, more than 300 voluntary 
agreements (VAs) have been created in the European Union (Aggeri, 1999).  Governments 
justify their interest in this approach by its potential to reduce the increasing administrative 
costs of direct regulation, by the political difficulties in introducing taxes and permit systems, 
and by the support VAs receive from industry groups (Carraro and Lévêque, 1999).  Just as in 
the case of economic instruments, VAs leave room for flexibility and hence for potential 
efficiency gains over regulations using a strict command and control approach. 
A large number of voluntary programs can be found in agriculture.  Programs seek to 
reduce negative externalities, such as nitrate and pesticide leaching into groundwater, as well 
as to pose incentives to maintain and improve the provision of public goods, such as 
ecologically important landscape elements.  Voluntary approaches have been deemed 
appropriate for the regulation of environmental impacts of agriculture because of the 
nonpoint source character of many pollution problems.  Nonpoint sources are difficult to 
identify and monitor which renders compulsory regulation difficult to implement.  In 
addition, agriculture has a long history of public support in the development and diffusion of 
new technologies as documented by the important role that governments attribute to 
education programs and agricultural extension services. 
The growing interest in voluntary agreements calls for an assessment of their efficiency 
in improving environmental impacts.  Hanley et al. (1999) point to the need to develop 
methods evaluating the environmental achievements of stewardship programs.  This exercise 
may be simple when program objectives are uni-dimensional, for example, when protecting a 
single endangered species.  However, many environmental programs in agriculture are not  
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only concerned with one precise environmental variable but tackle several issues at once.   
This makes it difficult to measure their success in achieving multiple objectives.   
Some papers have assessed the success of agri-environmental programs by analyzing the 
adoption of environmentally sound production practices (e.g., Lichtenberg et al., 1993).  
However, little research has been done assessing the achievement of general environmental 
performance objectives.  Advances in the conception of agri-environmental indicators 
(OECD, 2001) and environmental efficiency analysis (Tyteca, 1997) make such analyses 
possible.   
In this paper, we analyze the environmental performance and efficiency of farms 
participating in a voluntary public scheme encouraging environmentally friendly agricultural 
practices.  We do this in a comparative analysis of farms participating or not in the VA.  
Environmental performance is measured by agri-environmental indicators measuring the 
adoption of environmentally friendly practices and the provision of valuable amenities.  
Efficiency can be measured according to different concepts.  A firm is considered to be 
technical efficient if it operates on the production frontier.  Private economic efficiency 
means operating at the profit-maximizing or cost-minimizing amount of outputs and inputs, 
so that the marginal value product equals marginal costs.  Social economic efficiency refers 
to producing at output and input levels that maximize social welfare.  Technical efficiency is 
a necessary condition for private economic efficiency.  In the absence of externalities and 
other market failures, private economic efficiency will coincide with social efficiency as the 
first theorem of welfare economics shows.  In the presence of externalities, however, social 
efficiency is neither implied nor implies private economic efficiency, because market prices 
do not coincide with social values.   
Environmental efficiency is a concept closely related to technical efficiency where 
positive or negative externalities are included in the production frontier.  Again 
environmental efficiency as defined here and social economic efficiency may not coincide as 
the mix of outputs and externalities may not correspond to the socially optimal output mix.    
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We measure efficiency by data envelope analysis (DEA).  This approach allows 
overcoming problems associated with the aggregation of several environmental indicators 
(Tyteca, 1997).  It takes into account the technical efficiency of resource use and can be 
extended to account for the production of non-market amenities and weakly disposable 
outputs, i.e., outputs that can only be decreased by decreasing output or input.   
Showing that a farms participating in a VA have a better environmental performance and 
efficiency is thus certainly not sufficient to prove its overall social efficiency.  This would 
require a detailed economic evaluation of positive and negative externalities.  Nevertheless, 
observable improvements in the environmental performance of participating farms over non-
participant farms are a requirement for any useful environmental regulation.  Our objective is 
thus to test whether farms participating in a voluntary public schemes are technically and 
environmentally more efficient than those farms not participating in this scheme.  If we have 
this evidence, then we can conclude that the scheme is not void of environmental content in 
that participants contribute to the protection of the environment relative to non-participants. 
The VA of our choice is the whole farm plan (WFP) that has been proposed to farmers in 
Wallonia, Belgium, since the introduction of the agri-environmental stewardship programs 
according to EU regulation 2078/92 in 1994. Using a collection of agri-environmental 
indicators and DEA, we compare a sample composed of farms having established a plan to a 
sample of farms not having subscribed to the program.  In the remainder of the paper we give 
a short overview of the literature on voluntary environmental agreements and introduce then, 
in section 3, the WFP implemented in southern Belgium.  We discuss the methods and data 
collection procedure in section 4.  Results are presented in section 5 and the paper concludes.   
2.  Voluntary Agreements  
The term “voluntary agreements” refers to a multitude of approaches in environmental 
policies.  In voluntary approaches, firms commit to improve their environmental performance 
exceeding legal requirements.  VAs are being used to encourage holistic, multi-media 
strategies to environmental protection in contrast to economic and command and control  
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regulations that are often media-specific or focus on end-of-pipe technologies (Khanna, 
2001).  They can be classified into unilateral commitments being set up by firms, negotiated 
agreements involving contracts between public authorities and individual firms, and public 
voluntary schemes consisting of frameworks that are developed by the environmental agency 
and voluntarily adopted by individual firms (Carraro and Lévêque, 1999).   
2.1. Economic evaluation of VAs 
It seems puzzling that public decision makers are willing to form VAs with polluting firms 
because such arrangements may give considerable negotiating power to the firms to be 
regulated.  But moral hazard prevailing in environmental regulation might be better dealt with 
on a “cooperative” basis and transaction and monitoring cost could substantially be reduced.  
Indeed, public decision makers preserve their negotiation power by credible legislative 
threats of stricter mandatory regulation in the case that the environmental goals fixed in VAs 
are not achieved (Segerson and Miceli, 1998).  
The efficiency of VAs is much debated.  They may improve a firm’s public image and 
leave more flexibility to firms in achieving environmental goals and thus may provide cost 
reduction possibilities with respect to compliance, administrative and transaction costs 
(Börkey et al., 1999).  Despite this flexibility and the resulting cost reductions, VAs may not 
be efficient in achieving an environmental standard for two reasons: Firms have the 
possibility to disrespect their commitments and firms may declare an easy target to reach 
(Carraro & Lévêque, 1999).  As a result, VAs may lead lower environmental standards and 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms may not be reliable.  In badly designed VAs, free-
rider problems may prevail, so that found agreements lack credibility in public opinion and 
are not accepted by non-government organisations (Lévêque, 1997).  Binding agreements 
provide more guaranties for reaching environmental standards (Lefèvre, 2000).  The success 
of non-binding agreements depends then on the simultaneous existence of a credible threat of 
stricter legislation and correct incentives encouraging firms to participate.      
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VAs will be efficient in defining an appropriate environmental quality standard if these 
non-binding programs are used as a complement of other regulatory tools rather than as a 
substitute of them. A good example (Lefèvre 2000) is the Danish scheme on greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction that includes a financial support (investment grants and CO2 rebates).  
Aggeri (1999) considers that the use of VAs can be justified in cases of nonpoint source 
pollution, where a large number of heterogeneous actors is involved, the number of 
transformation stages is significant and the level of uncertainty is high.  In these cases, strong 
coordination mechanisms are required in setting quantitative objectives and in designating 
responsibilities, know-how transfer rules, and monitoring schemes.  VAs can provide such 
mechanisms, even if they provide lower incentives for abatement than other economic 
instruments.  
The efficiency of voluntary agreements in achieving a design standard has been analyzed 
by Strandlund (1995) and by Wu and Babcock (1999).  Wu and Babcock compared the 
relative efficiency of voluntary versus mandatory programs in attaining environmental 
targets. They conclude that a voluntary program is more efficient if and only if the 
deadweight loss of government expenditure under the voluntary program is less than the 
difference between private and public costs of government services plus the additional 
implementation cost of the mandatory program.  This condition is more likely to be met if the 
number of participating firms is large, if the deadweight loss of raising government revenue 
is small, and if the cost of government services is smaller than the private provision of the 
same services. 
2.3. VAs as stimulus for innovation  
VAs can reduce compliance and transaction costs by allowing polluters flexibility in the 
choice of technology through which environmental performance targets are met.  In several 
cases, this flexibility may stimulate innovation. By being first in adopting and developing 
new technologies, firms participating in VAs can push for tightened mandatory regulation 
that increases their compliance cost by less than its competitors’ costs.  Environmental  
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innovators improve as a result their strategic position in the industry (Salop and Scheffman, 
1983, Videras and Alberini, 2000).
1  
That innovation at the source is an important process for improving environmental 
conditions is observed in several examples.  In the last decades in the Netherlands, agriculture 
has rapidly progressed and has frequently resorted to innovations (David et al., 2000).  The 
Dutch government has contributed to this success by investing in research, education, and 
extension, but it has also understood that delegating more authority and responsibility to 
firms reduces public expenses and increases the environmental involvement of firms.  
Another example is the case of end-of-life vehicles.  In a case study of the French car 
industry, Aggeri (1999) argues that the voluntary approach is required to achieve ambitious 
environmental targets in situations of uncertainty that require a coordinated process of 
innovation. The VA encouraged learning and innovation processes within and between firms.  
3. The Walloon Whole Farm Plan 
Our study draws on the Belgian experience with an environmental whole farm plan proposed 
within as part of the agri-environmental program implement regulation EC 2078/92 
succeeded by EC 1257/1999.  According to this regulation, member states develop programs 
designed to recompense farmers for their environmental friendly activities and to improve the 
environmental performance of existing farms.  The objectives are to establish farming 
practices and production methods that reflect the need for environmental conservation and 
protection, to protect wildlife habitats and endangered species of flora and fauna, and to 
produce quality food in an extensive and environmentally friendly manner.  Although 
member states are required to implement an agri-environmental program, landowners’ 
participation is voluntary.  
The components of the Walloon agri-environmental program that was first started in 
1994 are summarized in table 1.  In transposing the European regulation, the Walloon region 
distinguishes between the region as a whole and environmentally sensitive areas.  Those 
                                            
1 However, this flexibility could also lead firms to inaction (see ENDS, 1994, for a critical discussion).  
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include, e.g., regions facing difficulties of meeting the objectives set out in the EU nitrate 
directive (91/676/CEE) and natural parks.
2  There are six horizontal agri-environmental 
programs, accessible to all farmers in the Walloon region independent of their location.  The 
horizontal programs support extensive pasture management, extensive field margins, the 
maintenance of hedges, fruit trees, and ponds, reduction of livestock densities and the 
conservation of traditional plant varieties and animal breeds.   
Five vertical programs are only accessible in the environmentally sensitive areas.  The 
latter encourage the reduction of inputs in cereal and maize production, winter green cover 
crops, very extensive pasture management, and the protection of wetlands.  These programs 
have been conceived to encourage the protection of natural resources in sensitive areas.  In a 
first introduction of the program from 1994 to 1999, vertical programs were only accessible 
in the sensitive areas.  Farmers there had to adopt at least three individual agri-environmental 
measures and to subscribe to a whole farm plan.  This ‘vertical’ integration of individual 
measures was thought to improve the environmental effectiveness of the program.  The 
adoption of the WFP itself is not supported by subsidies; however, it is a necessary access 
condition to some of the subsidy supported agri-environmental programs in certain areas.   
Those requirements, however, hampered adoption.  Because these vertical measures 
were thought to be of particular importance in the sensitive areas, the Walloon government 
amended the regulation in March 1999, so that vertical programs could be adopted 
individually and without subscribing to the WFP in the sensitive areas.  At the same time, 
vertical measures became accessible to farmers outside environmentally sensitive areas.  
During the period from March 1999 to December 2000, vertically restricted programs could 
be adopted outside the sensitive zones if farmers agreed to subscribe to at least three 
programs and if they subscribed at the same time to a whole farm management plan.
3   
                                            
2 The environmentally sensitive areas are 16 distinct areas counting a total of 7 564 ha agricultural land, or an 
equivalent of about 1% of agricultural land in Wallonia. 
3 The agri-environment program has been revised in response to EC 1257/1999 and is now part of the Walloon 
Rural Development Plan.  The WFP is no longer mandatory to qualify for the vertical stewardship programs.  
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The WFP consists of a description of the farm and its production activities, and examines 
the farm’s environmental approach in seven categories: (1) the application of the good 
agricultural practice; (2) application of new and improved cultural practices; (3) control of 
technical material (pesticide/effluent storage; sprayer, etc.); (4) pest management; (5) plant 
nutrition management; (6) landscape integration; and (7) nature protection and landscape 
integration.  The plan is prepared in collaboration between the farmer and the regional 
administration and the assessment of current farm practices leads to the definition of short-
term (1 year), medium-term (5 years), and long-term objectives.  Progress towards these 
objectives is to be reviewed regularly (annually) and objectives can be adapted to take 
changes into account.  The WFP consists of a five-year contract.  The focus of the whole 
farm plan lies explicitly in improving the overall environmental approach of the participating 
farm.  Until the end of 1999, about 4-5% of the eligible farms outside the zones of particular 
environmental statute have subscribed to the whole farm plan.  Farmers receive no financial 
compensation for subscribing to the WFP.  Incitation consist of technical support in 
evaluation the environmental condition of the farm and in making some subsidized programs 
(the vertical measures) accessible.  It is thus not surprising that during the 1999-2000 period, 
almost exclusively farmers outside sensitive areas and interested in vertical measures 
subscribed to the WFP. 
4.  The measurement of environmental performance 
We employ two approaches to measure the environmental performance of farms.  First we 
use a set of agri-environmental indicators developed by the Walloon administration.  The 
problem with this type of indicators is that it is difficult to globally assess environmental 
impacts.  Indicators are more or less focused on one particular aspect of environmental 
protection and often several indicators tackle one aspect from different angles.  For example, 
an indicator on nitrogen fertilization per hectare deals with questions of soil and water 
protection, and is often complemented by indicators analyzing the equilibrium of organic 
matters on agricultural land or animal stocking density.  
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When analyzing the global environmental performance of farms, the indicator method 
encounters problems when it comes to aggregation issues.  How to weigh different indicators 
in the aggregation and how to account for the technical efficiency of production?  Methods, 
such as ecopoints employed in lower Austria to calculate stewardship subsidies (Van 
Huylenbroeck and Whitby, 1999), are criticized for arbitrarily aggregating different 
indicators.  While problematic, aggregation of indicators is an important issue.  Especially if 
programs and farms are to be evaluated on their environmental contributions to landscape 
management and pollution reduction, an overall performance indicator is necessary.   We 
thus use in a second instance DEA to calculate an overall index of environmental efficiency.  
DEA allows evaluating the technical and environmental efficiency of farms by calculating 
weights that compare each individual farm to the entire sample.   
4.1  Agri-environmental indicators 
The agri-environmental indicators evaluated in this study are those developed by the Walloon 
administration in order to evaluate the environmental performance of farms (Grosjean, 2000).  
Table 2 provides a list of the indicators used.  They can be grouped into a set of indicators 
measuring the adoption of practices aimed at reducing the environmental intensity related to 
soil and water protection and a second set of indicators evaluating the provision of desirable 
environmental services, such as landscape amenities.  This classification is not unambiguous, 
as some indicators relate to both aspects.  The table shows also a range of benchmark values 
according to which an indicator is considered signifying low, medium, and high 
environmental benefits. 
4.2 Data envelopment analysis measuring environmental efficiency 
Recent studies have used DEA to evaluate not only technical and economic efficiency but 
also environmental efficiency.  This extension goes back to Färe et al. (1989) who include 
weakly disposable inputs in the technology.  Färe et al. (1996) propose an indicator of the 
environmental performance based on the separability of the distance function.  Ball et al.  
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(1994) and Piot-Lepetit and Le Moing (2000) apply similar methods in the agricultural 
context. 
In our application, we introduce in addition to weakly disposable undesirable outputs 
also desirable non-market outputs. These include the provision of environmental services 
such as cultural variety as measured by a crop rotation indicator and space for nature 
protection such as marginal grassland, marginal arable land, and small landscape elements, 
hedges, trees, and wetlands. 
We consider a set of k = 1, 2, …, K farms that use N inputs 
N k x + ℜ ∈  and produce M 
desirable market outputs 
M k y + ℜ ∈ , I desirable non-market outputs 
I k z + ℜ ∈ , and  J non-
desirable output, 
J k w + ℜ ∈ .  The outputs 
k y  and 
k z  are strongly disposable, whereas 
k w  is 
weakly disposable.  The indices of efficiency used in our analysis deal only with aspects of 
technical efficiency and not with allocative efficiency, and thus all variables can be 
determined in physical or economic units. 
To introduce the concept of technical efficiency, we first establish the convex free-
disposal hull technology involving only inputs, x, and desirable market outputs, y.  It is 
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The key concept in deriving technical efficiency is the input distance function that leads 
to radial measure of technical efficiency,  Tech θ ¸ measuring the distance between the farm 
under consideration and the convex hull of the efficient farms:   
{} K k T y x
k k
Tech , ... , 1 ) , ( : min = ∈ = θ θ θ
θ     (2) 
When we account for weakly disposable outputs, w, then the new production technology 
is described by the set   
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  () {} w y x w y x TEnv and produce can : , , = .    (3)
Desirable outputs, y, and undesirable outputs, w, are distinguished by the property of weak 
and strong disposability.  While y is strongly disposable, i.e., if  Env T w y x ∈ ) , , (  and if  y y ≤ ' , 
then  Env T w y x ∈ ) , ' , (,   w is weakly disposable and thus when  S w y x ∈ ) , , (  and  1 0 ≤ ≤ τ , then 
Env T w y x ∈ ) , , ( τ τ .  A reduction in the weakly disposable output can only be achieved at a 
cost, either by reducing the desirable output y or by increasing input use x. 
We measure environmental efficiency as  
() {} Env
k k k k
Env T w y x ∈ = θ θ θ θ
θ , , : inf        (4) 
Under the assumption that the distance function is separable in the weakly disposable outputs 
and the technical efficiency score, this index has the convenient property that it can be 
decomposed into an index of pure input efficiency,  Tech θ , and an index capturing the effects 
of undesirable outputs (Färe et al., 1996). 
Finally, we introduce desirable non-market outputs by augmenting the vector of desirable 
market outputs, y, by the vector of desirable non-market outputs, z.  We define an amenity 
and environmental efficiency index as  
{} K k T w z y x Env Amen
k k k k
Env Amen , ... , 1 ) , , , ( : min & & = ∈ = θ θ θ θ
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This index can be reduced to a pure amenity index by ignoring the effect on non-desirable 
outputs.  We call this index  Amen θ  and calculate it according to   
{} K k T z y x Amen
k k k
Amen , ... , 1 ) , , ( : min = ∈ = θ θ θ
θ       (7) 
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Table 3 defines the indicators entering vectors x, y, w, and z in the empirical analysis.  We 
follow Ball et al. (1994) and Piot-Lepetit and Le Moing (2000) in the definition of desirable 
market outputs.  They are measured in terms of gross revenue from animal and plant 
production activities.  Outputs have been aggregated using farm level prices instead of 
average to account for quality differences.  Milk output has been adjusted to a base fat-
content and sugar beet production has been adjusted by sugar content.   
Inputs are land, labor, the number of large animal units and mineral nitrogen fertilization.  
Restricting the survey to a region of a common soil and farm structure controlled quality 
variability of inputs.  Restricting the survey to a region of a common soil and farm structure 
minimized quality variability of inputs.  The only weakly disposable output, w, entering the 
analysis is organic nitrogen.  While being an input to crop production, it has become more of 
a liability to farmers in the study region.  It is one of the key threats to groundwater quality in 
the area.   
As positive amenity outputs, z, we account for extensively managed land and the crop 
rotation index as an indicator of variety.  Crop rotation is perceived as an important landscape 
value in the European context.  Furthermore, crop rotation is known to reduce the use 
pesticides and herbicides in agriculture and to improve soil fertility (McLaughlin and 
Mineau, 1995).  Marginal land use augments the habitat available for flora and fauna.  
5.  Results 
A farm survey was implemented in the spring of 2001 in the Condroz region in south-central 
Belgium.  Nine communities were chosen on the basis on similar pedo-climatic conditions.  
The region is not of any particular environmental statute, and hence, during the period March 
1999 – December 2000, farms could only qualify for vertical agri-environmental programs by 
adopting a whole farm plan for a five-year period.  We chose farms having adopted the plan 
according to the database of the local administration.  Non-adopters were chosen from a  
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random sample of 200 farmers obtained from the National Statistics Institute.  In total, 28 
farms having adopted a WFP and 24 farms that have not adopted a WFP were evaluated.
4 
The area is characterized by silty soils and predominately cultivated by mixed crop and 
livestock farms.  In order to assure the homogeneity of the sample, farms in the process of 
converting to organic agriculture and those with large pork and broiler production were 
eliminated from the sample. Some farm characteristics of our sample are presented in table 4. 
The average farm size in the sample is about 46 ha of arable land, 33 ha of grassland. 
Livestock rearing includes dairy production and beef production.  Farms have on average 
103.5 large livestock units (LAU) of which 15 are dairy cows and 47 are suckler cows.  
Important crops include cereals, fodder maize, sugar beets, and potatoes. 
Non-adopters and adopters differ mostly with respect to holdings of arable land.  Non-
adopters cultivate on average 27 ha, while adopters cultivate about 63 ha.  This considerable 
difference can be explained by the interest of farmers with large areas of arable land for some 
of the vertical agri-environmental programs, such as that subsidizing cover crops during 
winter fallow.  For this vertical measure they can receive a subsidy of 100 €/ha if they adopt 
2 other measures and if they develop a WFP.  
5.1  Agri-environmental Indicators 
Table 2 shows in columns 5-10 the results on evaluated agri-environmental indicators.  
Indicators on water and soil protection practices show on average a better performance of 
adopters in comparison to non-adopters.  The percentage of mechanically, instead of 
chemically, weeded row crops, i.e., sugar beets and maize, is higher.  It is, however, 
relatively low for both subsamples.  Also the indicator on integrated pest management is 
higher for adopters. This indicator is a qualitative measure evaluating on a scale from 1 to 10 
the quality of advice farmers seek in making their pest management decisions (pest forecasts, 
education level of pest management consultants etc.) 
                                            
4 The survey was started in February 2001 by visiting the farms.  However, due to the interdiction to visit farms 
in response to the foot and mouth disease, about half the sample was interviewed by a written questionnaire and 
by phone.  
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The percentage of winter fallow land planted with cover crops is 59% in contrast to non-
adopters where no winter cover crops are planted.  However, this indicator is to be assessed 
carefully as it does not consider the amount of fallow land during winter.  Many of the non-
adopters have less land in arable crops and less land might be bare during winter. 
Regarding the management of nitrogen fertilizer, adopters apply less excess fertilizer 
than non-adopters.  The “crop nitrogen fertilizer” index is constructed as a weighted deviation 
of fertilization from the recommended norm and results on average as 12.8 versus 16.5 for 
non-adopters.  However, animal-rearing activity is less tied to land, and the animal density 
per hectare fodder crops is 3.96 versus 3.16.  Nevertheless, the soil equilibrium indicator 
formed as the ratio of total is organic nitrogen fertilizer available on the farm and total 
nitrogen fertilizer applicable on the farm, results as 0.67 whereas it is 0.76 for non-adopters. 
The percentage of riverbanks protected from agricultural run-off by extensive farming 
practices is 79% for farms with a WFP and 0% for farms without WFP.  While this indicator 
is not statistically representative as only 11 farms in the sample have creeks crossing or 
bordering their land, it gives some indication that farmers having adopted the WFP are more 
sensitive to such issues.
5 
As far as nature protection practices are concerned, adopters of the WFP dedicate a lower 
percentage of grassland to marginal utilization, 3.2 % versus 7.5 %.  Marginal grassland is 
defined as grassland that the farmer uses in a less intensive way (low fertilization, lower 
grazing intensity, etc.), be it because of its natural location or its distance from the farm.  
In percentage terms, less land is also dedicated to landscape elements such as hedges and 
wetlands, 9.99 versus 14.83.  However, a larger percentage of arable land is used marginally 
and cropped less intensively, 3.38% versus 1.36%.  This might be due to the fact that this 
indicator accounts for extensively managed field margins.  Extensively managed field 
margins receive currently a premium 36 Euro for an area 200 m
2 and many farms having 
                                            
5 On the 11 farms where rivers cross or border some of the farmland, five among the eight farms having adopted 
the WFP protect 100% of the riverbanks, whereas 0% of riverbanks are protected on the 3 farms not having 
adopted the WFP.  
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adopted a WFP have enrolled in this agri-environmental program.
6  Calculating the 
equivalent amount of hectares managed as marginal arable land and grassland or dedicated to 
landscape elements
7, adopters manage 13.4 ha as marginal land and non-adopters 9.41 ha.  
This amounts to 13% and 16%, respectively.   Finally, no significant differences are detected 
for the crop rotation indicator and the animal diversity indicator.  
In conclusion, we can state that farms having adopted a WFP perform better with respect 
to water and soil protection practices, but that these advances over non-adopters are relatively 
small.  Some nature protection practices are applied on larger shares of land, such as marginal 
cropland utilization, whereas those dedicated to marginal grassland management and 
landscape elements are more pronounced on farms not having adopted the WFP.  These 
results are in part due to agronomic differences across the farms in our sample.  Farms less 
interested in some of the vertical agri-environmental components of the program have not 
adopted the WFP that was a condition to access to these programs.   
5.2 Environmental Efficiency Analysis 
The results of the efficiency analysis are summarized for the entire sample in table 5.  
Average technical efficiency is 71% and 19% of the farms in the sample are considered as 
technically efficient.  As more outputs are included in the analysis, more farms are used to 
form the efficiency frontier and thus the efficiency indicators increase on average when 
taking not freely disposable and amenity outputs into the analysis.  The share of farms 
receiving an efficiency score of 1 increases to 29% for  Env θ , 46% for  Env Amen& θ , and 50% for 
Amen θ .  It is thus more interesting to compare the efficiency performance for a given indicator 
across different groups of farms rather than to compare different indicators across the entire 
sample.   
                                            
6 In our survey, it was difficult to distinguish marginal land that existed before the adoption of the stewardship 
programs from that having been created due to the adopted programs.  For marginal grasslands, our results 
indicate that they increase from 3.21% to 5.47% of total grasslands when accounting for those managed 
extensively under the agri-environmental program “marginal grassland management”. 




For this comparison by group, we adopt a procedure following Brockett and Golany 
(1996).  This procedure distinguishes between individual managerial efficiency and program 
efficiency.  It proceeds running the DEA on each group under consideration separately.  The 
inefficient farms are adjusted to the efficiency frontier for the respective group and the DEA 
is repeated for the pooled sample.  A Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank test is used to test for 
difference in the efficiency scores.  By adjusting the decision-making units obtained to the 
efficiency frontiers obtained in the first step, we compare the frontiers of each subgroup.  The 
problem caused by selection bias of inefficient farm managers into an efficient program is 
thus avoided. 
Table 6 groups the results of the efficiency analysis by farm characteristics.  We are most 
interested in the comparison of efficiency measure for adopters and non-adopters of the WFP.  
Results are shown in the upper left part of table 6.  Farms having adopted a WFP (group 2) 
perform better according to all efficiency measures.  Their average technical efficiency score 
is 0.96 versus 0.85 for non-adopters.  Looking on the one hand at the environmental 
efficiency,  Env θ , their efficiency taking into account the weakly disposable output of organic 
nitrogen, is at 0.93 nine percentage points higher than for non-adopters.  On the other hand, 
Amen θ , the indicator taking into account amenity outputs, adopters outperform non-adopters 
with 0.99 versus 0.92.  Finally, taking both types of environmental outputs into account as in 
Amen Env& θ , the average score increases from 0.93 for non-adopters to 0.98 for adopters.   The 
differences between adopters and non-adopters are all significant at the 5% level.   
Comparing  Tech θ to  Amen θ  and  Env θ  to  Amen Env& θ , one recognizes that the scores of non-
adopters increase relatively and absolutely more than the scores of adopters.  They relatively 
good performance regarding the provision of extensively used grassland. 
Other determinants of efficiency are tested using alternative groupings.  Grouping farms 
by their intensity measured in gross revenue per hectare that more intensive farms are more 
efficient in all respects while grouping farms by their size measured in land holding shows  
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significant differences for  Tech θ  and for  Amen θ .  Large farms have a significantly higher 
technical efficiency score and also a significantly higher score when accounting for amenity 
outputs.  This confirms other results in the literature, such as Hadri and Whittaker (1999) who 
found a small negative correlation between expenditures on fertilizer and farm chemicals on 
English dairy farms and Fuglie and Kascak (2001) who show for a large sample of US farms 
that larger farms adopt nature-resource conserving agricultural technology earlier.  Looking 
at the last comparison, we see that also farms with lower animal stocking density per hectare 
of land have a higher average scores for  Tech θ  and   Env θ .     
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we tested for the differences in environmental performance and efficiency 
between farms participating or not in a voluntary agreement.  Our review of the mostly 
theoretical literature has shown that VAs are an interesting alternative to compulsory 
approaches for many reasons, in particular for transaction cost and political economy reasons.  
But little empirical evidence is available to assess their capacity in improving environmental 
conditions. 
Our analysis was based on two components.  One considered the analysis of agri-
environmental indicators measuring the environmental performance of farms and the second 
was based on data envelopment analysis.  Our results show that farms having adopted a WFP 
perform better with respect to water and soil protection practices, but that their improvements 
over non-adopters are relatively small.  Some nature protection practices, such as marginal 
cropland utilization, are applied on larger shares of land whereas others, such as those 
dedicated to marginal grassland management and landscape elements, are more pronounced 
on farms not having adopted the WFP. 
For our sample of farms, farms having adopted the WFP perform better in terms of all 
efficiency indicators calculated.  While the VA under scrutiny in our analysis is a typical 
public voluntary scheme, it has some obliging factor in it.  Indeed, despite being accessible to  
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all farms, only those farms interested in adopting vertical agri-environmental programs 
subscribed to the WFP.   
The farms participating in the survey have been enrolled in the WFP for at most two 
years and one might wonder how differences between farmers with and without WFP have 
come about.  Farms with more environmentally friendly practices might be more attracted to 
subscribe to agri-environmental programs and some of these differences could have existed 
before.  But also the elaboration of the WFP and the contact with the field agent of the local 
administration would help to point out existing problems and hint to possible solutions.  
Lastly, other agri-environmental programs the farmer enrolls in influence some of the 
indicators.  Probably all of these factors play a role in explaining the observed differences and 
they are not exclusively due to the WFP. 
Lastly, it is important to emphasize that non-participating farms prove to have a 
significant potential with regard to nature protection and the provision of marginal land 
important for the ecological network.  This applies to extensively used grassland and to 
landscape elements.  It applies also to such important aspects as riverbanks and wetlands that 
receive only a low degree of protection among the non-adopters in our sample.  For these 
reasons, it might be useful to extend the application of WFP to farms currently not enrolled in 
the program.  However, this land is not attracted into vertical measures.  Having recognized 
this shortcoming, the administration is currently contemplating a revision of the WFP that 
encourages its adoption on a wider scale. 
Having identified significant differences between adopters and non-adopters of this 
voluntary agreement, future research should focus on explaining their origin.  Measuring and 
analyzing adaptation of technologies and environmental impact over time and an detailed 
analysis of how different components of agricultural policy impact farmers’ decisions would 
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Components of the Walloon agri-environmental program
1 









Extensive pasture management  Yes 
Extensive field margins  Yes 
Maintenance of hedge, fruit trees and 
wetlands 
Yes 
Reduction of livestock densities  Yes 




















Conservation of old plant varieties  Yes    
 
Inputs reductions in cereal production 
 
Yes 
Input reduction in maize production  Yes 
Winter green cover crops  Yes 






















  Whole farm plan  No  Accessible to all farmers 
 
1 Program for the period from March 1999 to December 2000. 
2 Sensitive areas include vulnerable zones, natural parks, groundwater protection zones, 












Adopters Non-adopters  Total 
       Mean  St.dev. Mean  St.dev. Mean  St.dev. 
Water and Soil protection practices                
% of arable acreage weeded mechanically   2  6  10  2.12  11.03  1.75  4.96  1.98  9.02 
Indicator on integrated pest management  2  6  10  9.31  1.81  8.03  2.58  8.83  2.19 
% of spring crop acreage covered by winter cover crops  20  60  100  59.46  31.52  0.00  0.00  35.95  38.17 
Crop nitrogen fertilization
1    20  0  -20  12.83 50.58  16.46 50.88  14.20 50.14 
% of arable acreage receiving organic matter  10  30  50  36.67   19.11  42.97  28.03  39.05  22.79 
Soil equilibrium
2    1.2  1.1  1  0.67 0.33  0.76 0.28  0.71 0.31 
Animal density in large animal units per ha fodder production  2.6  2  1.4  3.96  2.71  3.16  1.15  3.58  2.12 
Number of liquid manure spreading during winter month  0.8  0.4  0  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.29  0.07  0.27 
Manure storage capacity in month  2  4  6  4.88  3.51  4.76  1.94  4.82  2.70 
% of river protected banks from agricultural run-off by 
extensive farming practices  
20 60  100  79.16  36.46  0.00  0.00  57.57  47.94 
Nature protection practices                
% of extensively used grassland   15  20  25  3.21  6.25  7.47  9.48  5.29  8.20 
% of extensively cultivated crop land   5  15  25  3.38  4.66  1.36  3.10  2.65  4.24 
Percentage of arable land dedicated to landscape elements  1  3  5  9.99  9.56  14.83  18.69  12.17  14.45 
Extensively used land in ha equivalents  -  -  -  13.38  10.16  9.41  11.94  11.54  11.09 
Crop rotation indicator
3  3  5  7  5.93 2.01  5.84 2.72  5.90 2.28 
Farm animal diversity  1  3  5  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.73  0.75  0.73 
Number of observations       28  24  52 
 
1  Weighted average of difference from “the good agricultural practice” norm 
2  Ratio of organic nitrogen available on the farm and the organic nitrogen potentially applicable on the farm land 




Indicators entering the efficiency measures 








Tech θ   Env θ   Amen θ   Env Amen& θ
Revenue from crops (€)  39.006 
(41.1205) 
X X X X   
Freely disposable 
outputs (y) 
Revenue from animals (€)  74.9307 
(60.1092) 
X X X X 
Land (ha)  78.6 
(44.4) 
X X X X 
Number of large animal units (LAU)  103.5 
(67.9) 
X X X X 
Labor (Person)  1.6 
(0.7) 





Mineral Nitrogen (kg N)  8,718.3 
(5,863.9) 
X X X X 
 
Amenities (z) 
Marginal land (ha)  11.5 
(11.1) 
   X  X 
  Crop rotation indicator  5.9 
(2.3) 
   X  X 
Non-freely disposable 
output (w) 
Organic Nitrogen (kg N)  8,572.4 
(6,089.4) 
 






 Unit  Adopters  Non-adopters  Total 























































  Tech θ   Env θ   Amen θ   Env Amen& θ  
Mean 0.71  0.74  0.89  0.88 
Standard Deviation  0.21  0.21  0.16  0.16 
Minimum 0.27  0.29  0.39  0.37 





Test statistics assessing the relation between efficiency measures and descriptive statistics
 a 
  Whole farm plan  Intensity 
Group 
b 
Tech θ   Env θ   Amen θ   Env Amen& θ Tech θ   Env θ   Amen θ   Env Amen& θ
1  0.85 0.84 0.92 0.93  0.71 0.72 0.88 0.90 
2  0.96 0.93 0.99 0.98  0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 
Wilcoxon-Test
a           
Test  statistics  -2.4 -2.0 -1.7 -2.1  -4.6 -4.8 -5.1 -2.2 
p-value  0.008 0.023 0.050 0.019  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 
Significance ***  **  **  **  ***  ***  ***  ** 
  Acreage  Animal Stocking LAU/ha 
Group 
b 
Tech θ   Env θ   Amen θ   Env Amen& θ Tech θ   Env θ   Amen θ   Env Amen& θ
1  0.79 0.78 0.96 0.96  0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 
2  0.99 0.98 0.94 0.94  0.82 0.80 0.94 0.94 
Wilcoxon-Test
a           
Test  statistics  -4.78  -4.05  0.58 0.63  3.52 3.48 0.03 0.00 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.720 0.735  1.000 1.000 0.512 0.500 
Significance ***  ***    ***  ***  *** 
a One, two or three asterisks show significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
b The groups are defined as follows: 
−   Whole farm plan: 1: non-adopter (24 farms); 2: adopters (28 farms). 
−   Intensity: 1: revenue < 1388.2 €/ha (26 farms); 2: revenue > 1388.2 €//ha (26 farms). 
−   Acreage: 1: < 72.7 ha (26 farms); 2:  > 72.7 ha (26 farms). 
−   Animal Stocking in LAU/ha: 1: < 1.65 LAU/ha land (26 farms); 2: > 1.65 LAU/ha land 
(26 farms). 
 
 